The Squad Read online

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  © T. Ryle Dwyer, 2005

  ISBN: 9781856357487

  Cover photo of revolver courtesy of Cork Public Museum.

  This eBook is copyright material and must not be copied, reproduced, transferred, distributed, leased, licensed or publicly performed or used in any way except as specifcally permitted in writing by the publishers, as allowed under the terms and conditions under which it was purchased or as strictly permitted by applicable copyright law. Any unauthorised distribution or use of this text may be a direct infringement of the author’s and publisher’s rights and those responsible may be liable in law accordingly.

  PREFACE

  Michael Collins is frequently cited as the originator of modern urban terrorism. The British characterised his Squad as ‘the murder gang’ and had they knowingly captured members of the Squad, they would almost certainly have executed them. Many were stopped and even captured, but they were usually let go as they were not actually recognised as members of the Squad. They were saved by the great secrecy under which they operated, as were the spies, or moles, within the police force who worked for Collins and his intelligence organisation.

  The Squad made a vital contribution to the War of Independence but it did not win it. For one thing, it was effectively disbanded before the Truce and, anyway, the struggle was not a conventional war; it was rarely much more than a police action. The British army was only used sparingly. The Squad’s major role was both in helping the Irish side and provoking the forces of the crown. Collins set out with a plan to eliminate the most effective British detectives and thus knock out the eyes and ears of the Dublin Castle regime in order to provoke the British to retaliate blindly. His confident belief was that they would retaliate against innocent Irish people and thereby drive the Irish people as a whole into the arms of the republicans. The genius of Collins was as an organiser and an administrator. The Squad systematically eliminated many of the most effective detectives, with the help of information provided by police spies, or moles, working within the crown’s police forces and intelligence services.

  In view of the nature of their operation the Squad members and the moles worked undercover and most remained secretive about their activities. Many only spoke out in the early 1950s when the Bureau of Military History began interviewing veterans of the War of Independence with the assurance that the material would not be released in their lifetimes. As a result they could speak more freely and their statements now provide invaluable insights. Of course, the interviews, which were more than thirty years after the events, sometimes show just how much old men forget. But in the case of the Squad, the operations usually had several participants and the files provide not only first-hand accounts of the triggermen but also of those who were backing up the operation. These were more effective witnesses because, un like innocent bystanders, they would not have been surprised or shocked by the events. They were therefore in a position to ob serve more keenly.

  One does not normally read or hear accounts of the participants in an actual assassination, but the witness statements of the Squad contain many first-hand accounts by the men who pulled the triggers to kill those considered the enemy. They provide in valuable historical insights into what was happening behind the scenes. They help to explain not only what happened but also, in many cases, why it happened, though historians must be careful because Michael Collins was an extremely secretive individual. In most instances he did explain his reasons. When he gave orders for somebody to be killed the Squad carried out such orders without question. The accounts by his various moles also provide insights into the reasons but in some instances Collins probably carried the secrets with him to his grave.

  Having studied aspects of the War of Independence in depth for a number of other books, being afforded the opportunity to appreciate the ‘new’ details and recognise the first-hand confirmation of other information that was already in the public domain has been invaluable. Since such confirmation is of particular historical significance, I have concentrated in this book on the witness statements and have related the accounts as much as possible in the actual words of the men – or in some instances, the women – involved.

  I would like to thank the staff of the National Library for their unfailing courtesy and the staff of Kerry County Library for their assistance.

  TRD, Tralee, 2005

  CHAPTER 1

  ‘I KNEW HE WAS THE MAN’

  In January 1919, at the age of twenty-nine, Michael Collins took over as director of intelligence of the Irish Volunteers. It was in this area that he made his greatest mark. After almost ten years in exile in London he returned to Ireland when conscription was introduced by the British in January 1916. He took part in the Easter Rebellion, fighting in the General Post Office, and was interned subsequently in Frongoch.

  While interned Collins showed a flair for smuggling messages in and out of the camp. He was recognised in the camp as a ‘conscriptible’, having only left England after the introduction of conscription earlier in the year. He was released when the camp was shut down just before Christmas 1916. Back in Ireland he played a major role in the reorganisation of the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB). He also played a leading part in the election of Joseph McGuinness in the Longford by-election of April 1917. McGuinness and other recognised leaders of the movement were still in jail in England as a result of the Easter Rebellion when Collins came up with the idea of putting him up for election on a platform calling for the release of the prisoner: ‘Put him in to get him out,’ became the campaign slogan.

  Éamon de Valera and the other leaders objected to the idea but Collins ignored their instructions and put McGuinness forward where he narrowly won the seat. As a result, the prisoners were released in June 1917, little over a year after many of them had been sentenced to death or had their sentences commuted to life in prison. Following the release of the prisoners de Valera won election to Westminster in an East Clare by-election, winning the seat vacated through the death of Willie Redmond, brother of the leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party.

  The disparate elements of the independence movement came together under the Sinn Féin banner in October 1917 and Collins was elected to the party executive. He was one of the dynamic young men in the movement but he had a tendency to rub many members the wrong way. His nickname, ‘the Big Fellow’, was a term of derision, born out of his apparent sense of self-importance, although it soon became a term of endearment. Sinn Féin lost the first three Irish by-elections that it contested in early 1918. In April 1918 the British government introduced legislation that would authorise it to introduce conscription in Ireland. The Irish Parliamentary Party walked out of Westminster in protest, which appeared to justify the refusal of Sinn Féin’s four MPs to take their seats. They were pledged to establish a national assembly in Ireland. Through de Valera’s influence the Irish Catholic hierarchy virtually sanctified the anti-conscription campaign.

  Ned Broy, a confidential typist in his mid twenties at the detective division headquarters in Great Brunswick Street, Dublin, was from a farming family in Ballinure near Rathangan, County Kildare and had two great passions, a love of athletics and a hatred of the British empire. He was assigned to type up lists of Sinn Féin members who the crown police intended to round up for their republican activities. He gave a copy of the list to his cousin, Patrick Tracy, a clerk at Kingsbridge railway station. He did not know when the round up was to take place but he promised to warn Tracy in advance. Tracy passed on the complete list to Harry O’Hanrahan, a Sinn Féin symp
athiser who ran a shop and whose brother, Michael, was one of the leaders executed following the Easter Rebellion.

  On the day of the round up, Broy gave the further warning: ‘I met Tracy and told him,’ he said. ‘Tonight’s the night. Tell O’Han-rahan to tell the wanted men not to stay in their usual place of abode and to keep their heads.’ Detective Sergeant Joe Kavanagh of the DMP, passed on a similar warning to Thomas Gay, a librarian in the public library in Capel Street.

  Broy was summoned to do telephone duty that night at Dublin Castle by Detective Superintendent Owen Brien, the deputy head of the detective division. ‘You will be much more comfortable here,’ Brien told him. Broy looked forward to what he thought was going to be one raiding party after another coming up empty-handed.

  ‘ To my astonishment, continual telephone messages arrived from the various police parties, saying that they had arrested the party they were sent for. A telephone message came from a detective sergeant at Harcourt Street railway station saying, “That man has just left”.’ That was de Valera who was returning to his home in Greystones.

  ‘That man will get the suck-in of his life!’ a smug Detective Superintendent Brien remarked. He immediately rang the RIC headquarters to say that de Valera was on his way home.

  ‘I did not know what to think of the whole raid and what had gone wrong, but I thought that de Valera would surely get out at some intermediate station and not go home all the way to Greystones to be arrested there,’ Broy noted. ‘ To my further astonishment, about an hour afterwards, a telephone message arrived from the RIC at Greystones to say: “That man has been arrested”.’

  De Valera and the others had apparently allowed themselves to be taken in the belief that their arrest would help their cause. They were purportedly arrested for their part in a ‘German Plot’. Ever since being forewarned by American intelligence of plans for the Easter Rebellion, Admiral Sir William Reginald ‘Blinker’ Hall, the head of British naval intelligence, had been anxious for an excuse to suppress Irish nationalism. He had not tried to stop the rebellion because he believed it would afford an excuse to suppress this nationalism. He gained a great reputation for his handling of intelligence matters in the fight against Germany but exaggerated the significance of German efforts to enlist the support of Sinn Féin in 1918. ‘If he believed that the scrappy and inconclusive information which he held was definite proof of an actual plot then he was a fool,’ historian Eunan O’Halpin concluded. Hall clearly was no fool; he deliberately deceived his political masters into thinking that the Sinn Féin leaders were involved in some kind of plot with the Germans. While the war continued Hall had enormous influence, but this disappeared with the armistice and naval intelligence faded into the background. No credible evidence of any Sinn Féin involvement in the so-called ‘German Plot’ was ever produced, with the result that it had little credence in Ireland, where people concluded that Sinn Féin leaders were really arrested because of the success of their campaign against conscription. A few weeks later, Arthur Griffith, one of the founders of Sinn Fein, won a by-election from prison. This was a deadly blow to the Irish Parliamentary Party, which was now essentially moribund. After three successive defeats, Sinn Féin was on the move again.

  Collins had managed to avoid arrest and this left him in an even stronger position to exert his influence over the movement in the following months. ‘The Sinn Féiners boasted that their most important man had escaped arrest,’ Detective Superintendent Brien remarked to Broy a few days later.

  Opposition to conscription was so strong that the British did not dare to introduce it in Ireland and Sinn Féin got the credit.

  With de Valera and the other recognised leaders in jail, Collins and colleagues like Harry Boland extended their influence. They selected many of the candidates to stand for Sinn Féin in the snap general election called following the end of the Great War. Sinn Féin stood on a platform promising to abstain from Westminster and to establish a national parliament in Ireland that would seek international recognition at the post-war peace conference. The democracies had supposedly fought for the rights of small nations and Sinn Féin was determined to call their bluff. The party won 73 of the 105 seats and that included all but one of the contested seats outside the six counties of the northeast, where the Unionist Party was strongest.

  Collins had been functioning as adjutant general and director of organisation of the Irish Volunteers, who were soon to become known as the Irish Republican Army (IRA). In January 1919 he took over as director of intelligence from Eamonn Duggan, who had merely run intelligence as an adjunct of his legal practice and had only one man working for him.

  Collins set up a far-reaching network, incorporating intelligence gathering, counter intelligence and matters relating to prison escapes and smuggling (both arms and people). He was the brain behind the whole network and his industry was phenomenal. He retained personal control over work similar to that done by three different intelligence agencies in Britain: MI5, MI6 and MI9.

  An intelligence office was set up over the print shop of J. F. Fowler at 3 Crow Street which was just off Dame Street and right under the nose of Dublin Castle. Collins generally stayed away from that office. Joe O’Reilly acted as his main courier to the office and everyone in it. Members of the staff were supposedly ‘manufacturing agents’, but they spent much of their time in the office decoding intercepted messages.

  Liam Tobin, another Cork man, was in charge of the intelligence headquarters in Crow Street. He was an inconspicuous individual, tall and gaunt, with a tragic expression. He walked without moving his arms, which made him seem quite listless, in marked contrast with Collins who bounded from place to place. Tobin’s deputy was Tom Cullen, an affable, quick-witted individual from Wicklow who had fought in the Easter Rebellion. He was not only intelligent but also a good athlete and a handsome young man with a fresh complexion and sparkling eyes. Frank Thornton was next in the chain of command at the headquarters, along with Frank Saurin, who stood out as one of the best-dressed men in the movement. He turned out in an impeccable suit and often wore lavender gloves. Some of the British made the mistake of assuming he looked too respectable to be a rebel, with the result that his sense of dress often amounted to a pass allowing him to saunter through enemy cordons.

  The developing staff of intelligence officers included people like Joe Guilfoyle, a veteran of Frongoch, and Joe Dolan, who wore a British army badge in his lapel with a red, white and blue ribbon. The badge, which was inscribed ‘For King & Country’, frequently allowed him to get out of sticky situations as the British assumed that he was a loyalist. Charlie Byrne, another of the new men, was called ‘the Count’ by colleagues, because of his appearance and his sense of humour. They were joined by Paddy Kennedy from Tipperary, Ned Kelliher and Charlie Dalton, Dan McDonnell from Dublin and Peter McGee.

  Each company of the Volunteers had its own intelligence officer (IO) and they reported to a brigade IO, who, in turn, reported to the intelligence headquarters under Tobin. Each IO was encouraged to enlist agents in all walks of life, but especially people in prominent positions who boasted of their British connections. ‘It is amazing the number of this type of people who, when it was put to them, eventually agreed to work for us and did tremendous work for us afterwards, whilst at the same time keeping their connection with the British forces,’ Thornton noted.

  Intelligence was divided into two areas. First there was the gathering of information on the movement of British forces, and second, information on the activity of British agents, whether they were members of the special intelligence service, military intelligence, or members of the various police intelligence units.

  ‘I was given the daily papers to look through,’ Charlie Dalton wrote of his first day on the job. ‘I was told to cut out any paragraphs referring to the personnel of the Royal Irish Constabulary, or military, such as transfers, their movement socially, attendance at wedding receptions, garden parties, etc. These I pasted on cards, which were
sent to the director of intelligence for his perusal and instructions. Photographs and other data, which were or might be of interest were cut out and put away. We often gathered useful information of the movements of important enemy personages in this manner. We also traced them by a study of Who’s Who, from which we learned the names of their connections and clubs. By intercepting their correspondence we were able to get a clue to their movements outside their strongholds.’

  Each of the intelligence officers had an area. ‘Mine covered hotels, restaurants, sports meetings and such other places where the auxiliaries and British secret service agents foregathered – Jammets, The Wicklow, The Shelbourne, Fullers, The Moira, The Central, etc.,’ Frank Saurin noted. ‘We had contacts in these hotels and restaurants, who passed on any information concerning enemy agents that might be of use to us. Through our agents I was enabled to get to know by sign a number of enemy personnel – the object being their extermination if and when the opportunity offered.’ He also handled one of the most important Irish agents, Lily Mernin, a young woman typist working in the British army command headquarters under Colonel Hill Dillon, the chief intelligence officer in Ireland. Mernin suggested other typists who were willing to provide information from their perspectives working with different military staffs around Dublin. She was the ‘one to whom a large amount of the credit for the success of intelligence must go’, according to Thornton.

  ‘One of the earliest jobs given to GHQ intelligence at Dublin was to ascertain the possibilities of getting at least one individual in every government department who was prepared to work quietly and secretly for our Army,’ Thornton recalled. ‘We were fairly lucky in having one individual who was working with us from the very commencement in records, who secured for us photographs and the names and addresses and history of practically all the typists and all the clerical workers in the most important departments of the enemy. These photographs and descriptions were handed out to the various intelligence officers throughout the areas in which these people lived and in a very short space of time we had a complete and full history of the sympathies and activities of each and every one of these individuals, resulting in quite a number of them, when contacted, agreeing to work for us inside the enemy lines.’